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ABSTRACT 
 
THOUGHT SUPPRESSION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NORMATIVE WINDOW MODEL 
OF PREJUDICE 
 
Hannah Buie 
Western Carolina University (March 2019) 
Director: Dr. Thomas E. Ford 
 
The following study presents a novel investigation of the moderating role of social norms in the 
suppression of stereotype-related thoughts and the subsequent rebound effect, hypothesizing that 
suppressing stereotyping thoughts regarding certain social groups leads to a greater rebound 
effect than suppressing stereotyping thoughts about other social groups. This experiment showed 
no evidence that social norms prescribing the way one should think about prejudice against a 
certain social group moderates the rebound effect. Participants in the suppression condition 
experienced the rebound effect, however the rebound effect was not significantly different across 
target social groups. While my results replicate past research in demonstrating the rebound effect 
across conditions, the results did not support my hypothesis as I did not find a significant 
difference in ease of thought suppression between social groups.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
“We have thoughts we would love to wish away—from worries and pains to annoyances, 
fears, and even horrors—and these thoughts are all the more distressing because we 
know we often can’t dispel them just by trying (Wegner, 2011).”  
 
As Wegner suggests, people often feel their minds are “invaded” by unwanted, distressful 
thoughts they cannot easily dispel. Social psychologists have shown that people sometimes 
experience such an invasion of prejudiced thoughts that violate their convictions, moral 
sensibilities and egalitarian social norms. Furthermore, upon encountering such thoughts, people 
try to “wish them away” or banish them through sheer effort and mental strength. That is, they 
actively try to suppress unwanted, prejudiced thoughts. After all, most people don’t want to be 
seen as racist, sexist or otherwise intolerant. Ironically, repeated or chronic attempts to suppress 
or censure unwanted prejudiced thoughts can backfire and result in a “rebound effect.” That is, 
suppressed prejudiced thoughts can later return to mind “with a vengeance” and result in even 
greater expressions of prejudice (Macrae, et al., 1994; Wegner et al., 1987).  
The present research contributes to this literature by investigating whether rebound 
effects resulting from prejudice suppression varies depending on the position the targeted social 
group occupies in society. In accordance with prevailing social norms, people habitually 
suppress prejudiced thoughts about groups for whom society’s attitudes are ambivalent such as 
women or African Americans. In contrast, because of the absence of normative pressure, people 
do not typically suppress prejudiced thoughts about groups for whom prejudice is justified such 
as neo-Nazis or criminals (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Crandall & Warner, 2005). Thus, I 
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propose that suppression of prejudice against such groups requires greater conscious attention, 
which in turn, results in a stronger rebound effect.  
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Social Norms as Motivators to Regulate Prejudice 
Social norms dictating how we should think about social groups and discrimination 
against them vary over time. These norms constrain the expression of prejudice (West & 
Hewstone, 2012). The emergence of egalitarian social norms prompted by the civil rights (and 
other) movement have led to obvious positive societal impacts- people in our society no longer 
condone racism as a culturally accepted practice. Indeed, changing egalitarian social norms can 
exert a positive influence on overt expressions of prejudice, increasing equitability in hiring and 
college acceptance beyond filling set quotas (Baron and Pfeffer, 1994; Williams and Sternthal, 
2012). Further, there is an emerging norm celebrating the strength of diversity in the workplace 
and educational settings (Lorenzo, et al., 2017). Emerging social norms like these can function as 
an external motivator through conformity pressure or as an internal motivator through conviction 
if adopted as one’s own values.  
Social Norms as External Motivators Influencing Attitudes  
In the United States, the civil rights movement of the 1960’s contributed to the shift of 
social norms to prohibit open expression of racial prejudice (Taylor, Sheatsly, & Greeley, 1978). 
Indeed, Whites began reporting having more positive racial attitudes (Taylor et al., 1978; 
Karlins, Coffman & Walters, 1969), suggesting that changing social norms led individuals to 
either adapt to holding less prejudice or suppress the expression of explicit prejudice to meet the 
new social norms or internal egalitarian values.  
The emergence of egalitarian norms during the civil rights movement of the 1960’s did 
not eradicate prejudice; they changed the way people experience and express it. Responding to 
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new normative pressures, subtle, more complex forms of racism such as “symbolic racism” 
(Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay & Hough, 1976), “modern racism” (McConahay, 1986), and 
“aversive racism” (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986) replaced the blatant hatred that characterized 
“old-fashioned” racism prior to the civil rights movement of the 1960’s. These contemporary 
models of racism suggest that Whites’ racial attitudes are now more ambivalent, containing 
egalitarian values while possessing underlying negative affect toward African Americans 
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Katz & Hass, 1988; McConahay, 1986). These contemporary 
models of racism examine the interplay of deliberate and implicit cognitive mechanisms that 
manage the expression and suppression of prejudice (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Pearson, 
Dovidio, and Gaertner, 2009). For instance, the theory of aversive racism argues that Whites 
often abide by prevailing egalitarian social norms and suppress prejudice against African 
Americans (a “normative ambiguity” group). Thus, Whites hold internalized emergent 
egalitarian norms and are careful not to behave in ways that violate them, meaning that social 
norms regulate the suppression and expression of prejudice.  
In a classic test of aversive racism, Gaertner (1973) demonstrated groups that hold 
egalitarian ideals closest might also struggle with aversive racism the most. In a between-
subjects design, a White or African American male confederate called liberal (a social group 
promoting egalitarian norms) and conservative leaning individuals and asked for help with car 
trouble (having “accidentally” called the participant on his last dime). Race served as the 
independent variable and willingness to help served as the dependent variable, measured through 
time on the phone and offered help. This design allowed Gaertner to examine reactions in the 
absence of the regulating forces of social norms, permitting the investigation of potential external 
versus internal motivators. Interestingly, liberal participants were significantly more likely to 
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hang up on the African American confederate compared to the White confederate. This finding 
demonstrates aversive racism- avoiding contact with the out-group in a situation seemingly free 
from the monitoring forces of social norms. However, if the participant stayed on the line, 
liberals were significantly more likely to help the African American confederate than 
conservatives. This finding demonstrates a more explicit form of prejudice- actually refusing 
help as opposed to avoiding contact. When social norms dictate egalitarianism, aversive racism 
demonstrates that prejudice is released in a form that likely won’t cause the perpetrator to be 
caught.  
A more recent study conducted by Dupree and Fiske (2018) found a similar effect of 
implicit bias. Their findings demonstrated that white liberals (again, a group that promotes 
egalitarian norms) tend to engage in a “competence downshift” when speaking to out groups 
stereotyped as less competent and lower status. In a meta-analysis of campaign speeches, they 
found that liberal candidates simplify issues and use less-complex language when talking to 
minority audiences compared to conservative candidates, who do not demonstrate a difference in 
the manner in which issues are discussed and complexity of language between social groups. 
They then replicated this finding in an experimental manipulation using the cover story of 
reporting on a book read to a white or black confederate. These findings suggest that while 
emerging egalitarian norms would ideally curb prejudice, there might be an ironic, 
counterintuitive consequence to those norms. External motivators (like social norms) pressuring 
individuals not to think certain thoughts might hold consequences of later bias when those norms 
are not perceived to be present (Dupree and Fiske, 2018; Gaertner, 1973; Pearson, Dovidio, and 
Gaertner, 2009).  
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Social Norms Regulate the Suppression and Expression of Prejudice    
Crandall and Eshleman’s (2003) Justification–Suppression Model of expression and 
suppression of prejudice builds on models of contemporary racism by providing a theoretical 
framework for understanding how social norms relate to the suppression and expression of 
prejudice more generally. Their model expands the concept of social norms as an external 
motivator to suppress prejudice, contending that people suppress prejudice in response to 
external motivators (social norms) and internal motivators (beliefs and values). Prejudice is 
expressed when “justified” through stereotypes or attributions (i.e. when context provides a 
justification for putting norms or values on hold).  
For example, Sechrist and Stangor (2001) demonstrated social norms can affect behavior 
typical of aversive racism. Participants who were high or low in racial prejudice were given 
information about their university’s racial beliefs. They were then given the opportunity to sit 
next to an African American confederate. High prejudice participants sat farther away from the 
African American when they believed the university shared their opinions about race than when 
they believed the university disagreed with their opinions about race. These findings demonstrate 
that a setting in which high prejudice individuals believe social norms align with their own acts 
as a releasor of prejudice, whereas when individuals believe social norms are more egalitarian, 
they suppress prejudice.  
The Normative Window Model of Prejudice 
Crandall’s normative window model of prejudice (Crandall & Warner, 2005; Ferguson & 
Crandall, 2006), depicted in Figure 1, built on Crandall and Eshleman’s (2003) Justification-
Suppression model, more explicitly defining how social norms dictate the social standing of 
specific social groups. This model contends that a social group occupies one of three 
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conceptually adjacent positions in society based on the degree to which society justifies 
prejudice against the group and the degree of societal consensus of the societal standard.  
 
 
Justified Prejudice Normative Ambiguity Unjustified Prejudice 
Examples:  
• Criminals 
• Neo-Nazis 
 
Examples: 
• African Americans 
• Women 
Examples:  
• Grandmothers 
• Farmers 
Social disposition toward group: 
 
• Socially defined as “bad,” deviant 
 
• Negative attitudes are condoned 
 
• Norm of justified prejudice is 
consensual, thus stable 
 
Social disposition toward group: 
 
• Socially defined as disadvantaged 
 
• Growing norm that negative 
attitudes are defined as “wrong” 
 
• Norm of unjustified prejudice is 
not societally consensual, thus 
unstable 
Social disposition toward group: 
 
• Socially defined as “good,” 
righteous 
 
• Negative attitudes are defined as 
“wrong” 
 
• Norm of unjustified prejudice is 
consensual, thus stable 
 
Figure 1. The Normative Window Model of Prejudice (Crandall & Warner, 2005).  
 
 
 
Crandall, Ferguson and Bahns (2013) define the left-most position, called the “justified 
prejudice region,” as social groups defined as deviant (e.g., harmful, morally inferior, violators 
of cherished values) and deserving of mistreatment. Current examples of these groups include 
criminals, racists and terrorists. Society defines prejudice against them as just, and perhaps even 
mandated by prevailing social norms. In fact, because groups like racists and terrorists violate 
our collective values of civility and morality, negative sentiments toward them are not even 
socially defined as a form of prejudice. Finally, because of the widespread consensual 
acceptance of this prejudice, it is stable and not likely to be affected by immediate social 
influences.  
 The right-most position, called the “unjustified prejudice region,” consists of groups 
consensually defined as good. These groups are not typically targets of prejudice. Groups in this 
region might be grandparents, firefighters, or nurses. They can be thought of as “righteous” 
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groups; society considers negative attitudes toward them as unjustified, wrong, or inappropriate. 
This norm of “unjustified prejudice” is also largely consensual and stable (Crandall, Ferguson 
and Bahns, 2013).  
 The middle position is called the “normative ambiguity region.” Groups in this region 
once belonged in the “justified prejudice region” (e.g., African-Americans, women, sexual 
minorities), experiencing explicit societal oppression (Crandall & Ferguson, 2005; Ferguson & 
Crandall, 2006). However, egalitarian social movements changed the way society collectively 
views such groups and discrimination against them, and “pushed” them from the “justified 
prejudice region” into the “normative ambiguity region” where they now occupy a position in 
society of shifting acceptability. Society increasingly considers prejudice against groups in this 
social position as wrong and unjustified. Due to growing norms of “unjustified prejudice,” 
people feel pressure to suppress prejudice against these groups under most circumstances. 
However, the emerging non-prejudice norms are not completely consensual, thus, they are 
unstable and vulnerable to situational influence. That means people, motivated by external 
pressure to conform to these shifting social norms, or motivated by internal forces (e.g., personal 
egalitarian values, religious beliefs; humanitarian goals), attempt to suppress their prejudiced 
thoughts and responses (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Crandall, Ferguson and Bahns, 2013; 
Dovidio, 2001; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Plant & Devine, 1998).  
Given that current social norms only regulate prejudice toward groups in the “normative 
ambiguity region” (those defined as socially disadvantaged), people are well practiced 
suppressing prejudice toward groups in the “normative ambiguity region” and only express 
prejudice toward them in certain conditions (Crandall and Eshleman, 2003). In contrast, due to 
the absence of normative pressure, people do not typically suppress prejudice against “justified 
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prejudice” groups and are therefore not well-practiced at suppression of prejudice against those 
groups (Crandall & Warner, 2005; Ferguson & Crandall, 2006, Crandall, Ferguson and Bahns, 
2013).  
The “Rebound Effect”: An Unintended Consequence of Prejudice Suppression 
Wegner, Schneider, Carter, and White (1987) identified an ironic consequence of thought 
suppression in their classic “white bear” studies. In these studies, half of the participants, those in 
the “suppression condition,” verbalized their conscious thoughts for five minutes while 
deliberately trying to not think about a white bear, and they rang a bell every time they did think 
of a white bear. Then, they freely verbalized thoughts about a white bear. The other half of the 
participants, those in the control condition, freely verbalized thoughts about a white bear without 
first attempting to suppress their thoughts about the white bear. Wegner et al. found that, in the 
free expression exercise, participants in the suppression condition verbalized more thoughts 
about a white bear than those in the control condition. Thus, attempts to suppress specific 
thoughts backfired and caused those thoughts to subsequently come to mind to an even greater 
degree.  
 Wegner (1994) identified the cognitive processes involved in thought suppression and 
subsequent rebound effects. He proposed that individuals engage in two reciprocal cognitive 
processes when attempting to suppress unwanted thoughts that result in the rebound effect. First, 
through an “operating process,” individuals consciously direct their attention to thoughts other 
than the unwanted thoughts. Second, through an unconscious “ironic monitoring process,” they 
scan consciousness for indications of unwanted thoughts. Ironically, by directing people to 
search for unwanted thoughts, the monitoring process repeatedly primes those thoughts, making 
them highly accessible. As a result, when people relax their conscious attempt at thought 
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suppression (the aforementioned operating process), unwanted thoughts become highly 
accessible and can influence subsequent judgment and behavior more than they normally would 
(Monteith, Sherman, & Devine, 1998a; Wegner & Erber, 1992). 
 Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, and Jetten (1994) reported the first experiments examining 
the rebound effect following attempts to suppress prejudiced thoughts. They told participants to 
write a short story about a typical day in the life of a skinhead, instructing half the participants to 
avoid stereotyping (suppression condition) and giving the other half no additional instructions 
(control condition). Then, they asked participants to write a second story about a typical day in 
the life of a second skinhead without giving either group additional directions regarding 
stereotyping. Participants in the suppression condition did suppress prejudice in the first story, 
describing the skinhead in the first story using fewer stereotypes than participants in the control 
condition. In the second story, the rebound effect was evident as participants in the suppression 
condition described the second skinhead using more stereotypes than participants in the control 
condition.     
 People also experience a rebound effect resulting from prejudice suppression when they 
spontaneously suppress prejudice in response to non-prejudice social norms. Wyer, Sherman, 
and Stroessner (1998) conducted an experiment in which they instructed White participants to 
complete a survey assessing their beliefs about African Americans. Following the paradigm 
established by Macrae et al., (1994), they instructed one group of participants to avoid 
stereotyping African Americans while completing the survey (explicit suppression condition). In 
order to examine the contrast between explicit directions to suppress stereotyping and the subtle 
influence of social norms on stereotype suppression, they told the second group that an African-
American political group was conducting the study (non-prejudice norm condition). Lastly, they 
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told a third group to simply complete the survey honestly and accurately (control condition). The 
participants then read a story about Donald, whose race was unspecified (Devine, 1989; Srull & 
Wyer, 1979). For example, Donald performed ambiguously aggressive behaviors stereotypically 
associated with African Americans (Devine & Elliot, 1995). Participants in the explicit 
suppression and the non-prejudice norm conditions exhibited a rebound effect. They perceived 
Donald more stereotypically, rating him as more hostile compared to participants in the control 
condition.    
Present Research 
The present research examined the impact of social norms on the suppression of 
stereotype-related thoughts and the subsequent rebound effect. Egalitarian (non-prejudice) norms 
motivated people to suppress prejudice against “normative ambiguity” groups but not “justified 
prejudice” groups (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Thus, individuals have less practice suppressing 
prejudice against “justified prejudice” groups than “normative ambiguity” groups. As a result, 
they should find active attempts to suppress prejudice against those groups to be a more difficult 
task, requiring more deliberate effort. From the framework of Wegner’s (1994) model, people 
must devote more effort to the “operating process” when attempting to suppress prejudiced 
thoughts about “justified prejudice” groups, and because people habitually generate negative, 
prejudiced thoughts about such groups, the “ironic monitoring process” should be more active, 
making unwanted, prejudiced thoughts highly accessible and likely to come to mind when one 
later relaxes attempts at thought suppression.  
Accordingly, I hypothesized that deliberate attempts to suppress prejudiced thoughts 
about a “justified prejudice” group would result in a greater rebound effect than attempts to 
suppress prejudiced thought about a “normative ambiguity” group. I tested this hypothesis using 
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an adaptation of Macrae et al.’s (1994) paradigm. Participants first wrote a short essay about a 
day in the life of a either a male neo-Nazi (“justified prejudice” group) or a male African 
American (“normative ambiguity” group) under instructions to suppress stereotypes of the 
depicted group or not. Then participants completed a lexical decision task to measure the 
accessibility of stereotypes about each group.  
I predicted that the suppression instructions would affect the accessibility of stereotypes 
differently when the target of suppression was a neo-Nazi versus an African American. 
Specifically, participants who attempted to suppress stereotypes about the male neo-Nazi in the 
essay, would exhibit greater stereotype accessibility in the lexical decision task than participants 
who attempted to suppress stereotypes about the male African American in the essay.   
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CHAPTER THREE: METHOD AND RESULTS 
 
Participants and Design 
Participants over 18 years old were recruited using the Western Carolina University 
participant pool. To estimate minimum sample size, I conducted a power analysis using 
G*Power 3.1 software (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & Buchner, 2007). I assumed an a of 0.05, power 
of .80 and a medium effect size, η2 = .25 (Cohen, 1966). The power analysis’ output parameters 
estimated a total sample size of 158. I collected data from 160, however 9 participants were 
excluded for response times greater than three standard deviations above the mean. Thus, our 
final sample included 151 students of Western Carolina University (85, 56.3% male) who 
participated in exchange for class credit. Participants’ age ranged from 18 to 23 years old (M = 
18.69, SD = 1.69). Participants self-identified as 120 (79.5%) White, 15 (9.9%) African 
American, 3 (2%) Asian, 8 (5.3%) Latino, and 5 (3.3%) other. I randomly assigned participants 
to one of four conditions in a 2(instruction: suppression, no suppression) x 2(social group: 
normative ambiguity, justified prejudice) between-subjects factorial design.  
Procedure 
 Upon arrival, participants completed a consent form and received a set of instructions 
(Appendix A) designed to mask the experimental manipulation. The instructions explained that 
participants would complete two separate and unrelated studies- one in which they compose a 
brief essay and one in which they identify words. I then informed participants that the first study 
examined an individual’s ability to construct life event details from visual information 
(Appendix B). They were then shown a picture of a male neo-Nazi or an African American male 
and given five minutes to compose a brief passage describing a typical day in the life of the 
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pictured individual. Before performing the task, participants in the suppression condition 
received the following additional instructions: “Please take five minutes to describe a day in the 
life of the pictured individual. Previous psychological research has established that our 
impression and evaluations of others are consistently biased by stereotypic preconceptions. In the 
present task, please avoid thinking about the target in such a manner.” Macrae et al. (1994) 
demonstrated that these instructions lead participants to suppress their stereotype-related 
thoughts during the essay writing task. In contrast, participants in the no suppression conditions 
were not given any additional instructions before constructing their passage.  
After writing the essay, participants completed a lexical decision task, measuring 
stereotype accessibility of the targeted group. Participants received the following instructions: 
“In the following task, a '*' will be presented at the center of the screen, and then a string of 
letters will briefly appear.  Your task is to decide whether or not the letters make up a valid 
English word. If the letters form a valid word, press the 'I' key. If the letters do NOT form a valid 
word, press the 'E' key. Try to classify the letter stimuli as words or nonwords as quickly and 
accurately as you can. When you are ready to begin, press the spacebar." After completing a 
practice round of four neutral and non-words, participants began the task. Participants were 
presented with strings of letters that represented stereotype-relevant words identified from a pilot 
study, neutral words chosen for matching number of syllables, and non-words also chosen for 
matching number of syllables (Appendix C).  
Pilot Study 
Fifty-six students of Western Carolina University (15, 26.8% male) participated in 
exchange for class credit. Participants’ age ranged from 18 to 50 years old (M = 21.22, SD = 
5.75). Participants self-identified as 47 (83.9%) White, five (8.9%) African American, two 
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(3.6%) Latino, and two (3.6%) American Indian. Participants received written instructions 
explaining that the researcher was interested in better understanding cultural stereotypes about 
different social groups (Appendix D). Participants listed traits they believed to be part of the 
cultural stereotype of each group.  
The coding scheme for the pilot study was created based on stereotype assessment 
literature (Devine, 1989; Duncan, 1976). Coding instructions mandated that each characteristic 
listed receive only one classification. Miscellaneous non-stereotype relevant traits (i.e. brown 
eyes) were placed in a separate category and are not included. I selected the five most commonly 
listed traits to represent the stereotype-relevant words for the lexical decision task in my study. 
Table 1 shows coding categories and the proportion of traits listed per category. 
 
 
Table 1. Percentage of traits per cultural stereotype category.  
 
African American Male 
(normative ambiguity group) 
Neo-Nazi Male 
(justified prejudice group)  
Aggressive (.39) Prejudiced (.33) 
Athletic (.31) Violent (.24) 
Criminal (.27) White (.11) 
Uneducated (.02) Uneducated (.08) 
Lazy (.01) Politically conservative (.07)  
 
 
 
Interestingly, the cultural stereotypes of African American men, the “normative ambiguity” 
group, revealed higher level of consensus, with three categories covering 97 percent of the traits 
listed. Under 1 percent of traits listed were miscellaneous. In contrast, there was less consensus 
regarding cultural stereotypes of neo-Nazi men, the “justified prejudice” group, with the top 
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three categories covering only 68 percent of the traits listed. A total of 17 percent of traits listed 
were miscellaneous. Importantly, these findings reflect Crandall’s normative window model of 
prejudice (Crandall & Warner, 2005; Ferguson & Crandall, 2006), demonstrating the differing 
influence of social norms on level of consensus and accessibility of cultural stereotypes by social 
group.   
Results 
Suppression Manipulation Check 
To ensure the thought suppression manipulation was effective, I measured the level of 
stereotyping in the passage. To compute this measure, two independent raters read each passage 
and counted the number of stereotypes in the essay. The raters were blind to experimental 
condition and the purpose of the study. There was a high correlation of number of stereotypes 
counted between raters, r(151) = .759, thus scores were collapsed and a single measure of 
number of stereotypes per passage was calculated. Overall, participants showed greater 
suppression when they received the suppression instructions (M = 1.20, SD = 1.27) than when 
they did not (M = 1.80, SD = 1.47), demonstrating a main effect of instruction F(1, 149) = 7.294, 
p = .008, with a large effect size hp2 = .047. There were no other main or interaction effects in 
level of stereotype suppression.  
Rebound Effect  
Based on my hypothesis, I predicted that participants would respond faster to stereotype-
relevant words associated with the “justified prejudice group” than the stereotype-relevant words 
associated with the “normative ambiguity” group in the suppression condition but not in the no-
suppression condition. I did not expect the suppression instructions or the group manipulation to 
affect response times to the non-stereotype-relevant words. To test these predictions I subjected 
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the response times to the stereotype-relevant and non-stereotype-relevant words to a 
2(instruction: suppression, no-suppression) x 2(group: justified prejudice, normative ambiguity) 
x 2(word type: stereotype-relevant, non-stereotype relevant) mixed model analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with instruction and group serving as between-subjects factors and with repeated 
measures on the word type factor.  
There was a significant instruction x group x word type interaction effect, F(1, 147) = 
4.05, p = .046, hp2 = .03. I further tested my hypothesis by conducting separate 2(instruction) x 
2(group) ANOVAs on the response times to stereotype-relevant and non-stereotype-relevant 
words (see Figure 2a and 2b). There were no main effects or interaction effects on the non-
stereotype-relevant words, all F-ratios < 1.00. The independent variable manipulations did not 
affect the accessibility of the non-stereotype-relevant words.  
In contrast, the ANOVA on the stereotype-relevant words revealed a significant main 
effect of instruction, F(1,147) = 15.43, p < .001, hp2 = .105. Overall, participants showed greater 
stereotype accessibility on the lexical decision task when they had received the suppression 
instructions (M = 602.89, SD = 0.72) than when they did not (M = 688.82, SD = 0.92). There 
were no other main or interaction effects.  
Failing to support my hypothesis, the instruction x group interaction effect was not 
significant, F(1, 147) = 0.298, p = .826, hp2 = .006. Thus, results replicated past findings in that 
both group conditions demonstrated the expected rebound effect based on suppression 
instructions. However, the group manipulation did not impact the rebound effect. Simple effects 
tests further demonstrated our findings of main effect of instruction. For the justified prejudice 
condition, stereotyping thoughts were significantly more accessible after suppression (M = 
607.73, SD = 156.08) than no suppression (M = 708.68, SD = 147.80). Likewise, in the 
 18 
normative ambiguity conditions, stereotyping thoughts were significantly more accessible after 
suppression (M = 598.04, SD = 106.52) than no suppression (M = 668.96, SD = 117.82), F(3, 
147) = 5.775, p < .001. However, ease of thought suppression between social groups was not 
significantly different, p = .755. 
 
 
Figure 2a. Mean response time of non-stereotype-relevant words as a function of condition.  
 
 
 
Figure 2b. Mean response time of stereotype-relevant words as a function of condition.  
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Discussion 
The present research replicated past findings in thought suppression research, that when 
individuals suppress thoughts, they experience an ironic rebound effect in which the thoughts 
they were attempting to suppress come back stronger than they otherwise would experience. 
However, my hypothesis was not supported. I found no evidence that this effect is moderated by 
the acceptability of prejudice against a group.  
The rebound effect represents an interesting interplay between deliberate and implicit 
cognitive processes. Conscious suppression of thoughts leads to a subsequent implicit rebound- 
in this case, a greater accessibility of stereotypes. The separation between the conscious and 
implicit processes is complex and merits further investigation. Given that attempted deliberate 
control can kick implicit processes into high gear, individuals low in prejudice must avoid the 
use of stereotypes as thought heuristics without using thought suppression.  Research suggests 
that truly low prejudice individuals have weaker associations between socials groups and typical 
negative traits, meaning negative traits are less likely to come to mind and stereotypes are less 
likely to be activated (LePore and Brown, 1997). These weaker connections are formed and 
maintained through internal motivation and/or underlying positive affect toward the target social 
group (Moskowitz et al., 1999; Ito, et al., 2015; Kang et al., 2014; Lapate et al., 2016). 
Internal motivation (holding core values that reflect the egalitarian social norms) appears 
to change the strength of the associative links between social groups and stereotype-related traits 
(Moskowitz et al., 1999; Ito, et al., 2015). In an investigation of whether cognitive control is 
involved in self-regulation of implicit bias, Ito and colleagues (2015) found that high internal 
motivation predicts lower implicit bias, and this lower bias is not moderated by executive 
function (meaning lower prejudice is not a function of greater capacity to consciously self-
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regulate bias). However, high external motivation was associated with greater implicit bias, and 
is moderated by executive function. Those with high executive function were better able to self-
regulate bias than those with low executive function. These findings are especially interesting in 
light of my investigation of thought suppression given that my study focused on the 
consequences of external motivation, demonstrating that when presented with external 
motivation, individuals have a low capacity to avoid the unintentional consequences of thought 
suppression. Given my findings on the rebound effect, an interesting extension of Ito et al.’s 
(2015) study would be to test whether executive function monitors individuals’ capacity to 
suppress prejudice across social groups.  
A relatively unexplored area in research investigating social cognition of prejudice 
regulation is underlying affect. This is surprising given that valence of affect toward the target 
social group is a common theme in prejudice literature. Underlying negative affect is theorized to 
drive biased behaviors and attitudes of both explicit and implicit bias. According to the cognitive 
consistency perspective, biased perceptions like stereotypes exist to justify particular attitudes 
toward a social group (a symbolic attitude). People develop biased perceptions (i.e. negative 
stereotypes) in order to justify the symbolic attitude. Thus, prejudice is a symbolic attitude based 
on a general negative affective reaction (for a review, see Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977).  
Underlying negative affect is also one of the foundational assumptions of the theory of 
aversive racism (Gaertner and Dovidio, 1986), which states that Whites still acquire negative 
sentiments toward African Americans. This negative affect is not likely based in rational 
thought, but rather learned in early childhood (Goodman, 1952). This implicit negative affect 
gives rise to feelings of discomfort, uneasiness, or fear in the presence of African Americans and 
often leads to avoidance (Hyers and Swim, 1998). Thus, aversive racism is a classic example of 
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the cognitive consistency perspective. Individuals hold unconscious negative attitudes that lead 
to a negative general affective reaction to the out group.  
New research suggests that one approach to decreasing these automatic, negative 
associations might be lovingkindness meditation (Kang et al., 2014; Lapate et al., 2016), 
suggesting that change in affect toward the amorphous other (the contemplative practice focuses 
on positive affect toward everyone, not limited to specific groups) decreases implicit bias toward 
target social groups. One limitation in this area is research thus far has focused exclusively on 
prejudice toward “normative ambiguity” groups. It is yet to be seen if change in affect impacts 
one’s broader view toward any social group, or if it is limited to “normative ambiguity” and 
“unjustified prejudice” social groups.  
Limitations and New Directions for Future Research 
While I found no evidence to suggest that, because people normally express prejudice 
against “justified prejudice” groups, it is harder to suppress prejudice about such groups, (which 
hypothetically would have resulted in greater rebound effects), the statistical model used does 
not allow us to draw definitive conclusions that there was no interaction. Using Bayesian 
inferencing might offer an analytical strategy that would lend more insight into whether there is a 
true absence of interaction. By using prior distribution of the parameter in place of a null 
hypothesis, we would be able to draw more substantial conclusions about my findings.  
There are many facets of thought suppression as a self-regulation strategy of stereotyping 
and prejudice that have yet to be explored, such as the neural correlates of the process. In initial 
research examining the neural correlates of thought suppression, researchers hypothesized that 
the conscious direction of attention to thoughts other than the unwanted thoughts was managed 
by the prefrontal cortex, while the detection and suppression of unwanted thoughts was regulated 
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primarily by the bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (Mitchell et. al., 2009). More recent findings 
demonstrate that these processes do not function as isolated processes located in singular neural 
regions, but actually function through neural networks across regions (for a review, Amodio, 
2014). However, research consistently shows that the anterior cingulate cortex plays a prominent 
role in thought suppression by relaying transient need for more control and increases when 
unwanted thoughts occur in order to suppress them (Mitchell et. al., 2009; Amodio, 2014).  
Whether the two cognitive processes proposed by Wegner (1994) to underlie thought 
suppression and the subsequent rebound effect implicate different neural networks has, to our 
knowledge, yet to be directly investigated. Thus, an investigation of whether the lateral 
prefrontal cortex, which manages the cognitive control of racial biases (Amodio, 2004; Amodio, 
2014), manages what Wegner called the operating process and whether the anterior cingulate 
cortex manages the implicit suppression of thoughts (Amodio, et al., 2004; Gehring & Fencsick, 
2001; van Veen & Carter, 2002; Amodio, 2014), operates as the ironic monitoring process would 
be an interesting next step. To test this idea, participants could perform stereotypical word 
associations related or not related to the target social group while assigned differing cognitive 
loads to measure the two processes (rehearse a 9-digit number- high cognitive load; no rehearsal- 
light cognitive load).  
Perhaps the most vital component of researching thought suppression related to 
stereotyping and prejudice is the application of findings in interpersonal interactions and 
relationships. Research investigating self-regulation of prejudice has typically focused on 
conscious, top-down mechanisms like thought suppression and thought replacement (Devine 
1989; Devine, 2017; Paluck, 2012; Pearson, Dovidio, and Gaertner, 2009). Further research is 
needed investigating automatic, bottom-up mechanisms that lead to lower prejudice levels. For 
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example, there is evidence to suggest that change in underlying negative affect results from 
subtle environmental cues like vivid counter-stereotypic examples, lowering implicit bias (Lai, et 
al., 2014). To my knowledge, we do not have concrete evidence that internalization of egalitarian 
social norms (i.e. internal motives) changes the valence of affect toward specific social groups, 
however given the theoretical importance of internal motives and underlying affect to level of 
prejudice, it would also be an interesting hypothesis to examine.   
Conclusion 
How individuals self-regulate stereotyping thoughts has broad implications for positive or 
negative interactions between social groups, as well as hiring in the workplace, school 
admittance, and many other circumstances. Catching ourselves in the act of using stereotypes is 
difficult given that they are by definition automatic associations. Even if one does catch oneself 
using a stereotype, how to avoid thinking or applying the stereotype presents what can seem to 
be an impossible situation, given that suppressing the thought could lead to the rebound effect. 
Further research is needed to examine self-regulation strategies in this area. My research 
replicates and supports past findings on thought suppression, suggesting that thought suppression 
is not an effective strategy in the self-regulation of prejudice and stereotyping.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Essay Directions 
Part 1: Directions given to all subjects.   
In this study, we’re examining an individual’s ability to construct life event details from visual 
information. The study is conducted through an online survey. Please follow the link on the 
board to access the survey. Your participation is voluntary. There is no penalty for not 
participating or stopping participation at any time. All-in-all the study should take about 10-15 
minutes. First, please read the consent form and date it. By dating the form, you are agreeing to 
participate in the study. 
 
Part 2: Participants were randomly assigned to one of the below two conditions and received the 
next directions in the context of the survey: 
1. Suppression condition: “Previous research in social psychology demonstrates that our 
impressions and evaluations of others are consistently biased by stereotype-based 
misconceptions. Please keep that bias in mind when writing your essay.”  
2. Control condition: no additional instructions given.  
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Appendix B: Essay Prompt Photos 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1. Male Neo-Nazi, (Koch, 2007).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2. Male African American, (JTS Digital Media, 2017).  
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Appendix C: Lexical Decision Task Stimuli 
Table A1. Letters representing stereotype-relevant words, neutral words, and non-words. 
Lexical Decision Task 
 African American Male Neo-Nazi Male 
Stereotype-Relevant Words Athletic Racist 
 Criminal White 
 Aggressive Violent 
 Loud Bigot 
 Dangerous Hateful 
 Uneducated Aggressive 
 Strong Angry 
 Angry Insane 
 Disrespectful Crazy 
 Ghetto Amoral 
 Muscular Threatening 
 Lazy Uneducated 
 Thief Ignorant  
Neutral Words Two Two 
 Industrialization Industrialization 
 Apartment Apartment 
 Communication Communication 
 Article  Article  
 Hurricane Hurricane 
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 Tug Tug 
 Sip Sip 
 Log Log 
 Electricity Electricity 
 Curious Curious 
 Shop Shop 
 How How 
Non-Words Amn Amn 
 Aramaicfrancine Aramaicfrancine 
 Gagesrives Gagesrives 
 Iorminaindicts Iorminaindicts 
 Andrusego Andrusego 
 Nunfy Nunfy 
 Indk Indk 
 Fieth Fieth 
 Latl Latl 
 Wot Wot 
 Dinarsutilization Dinarsutilization 
 Antetramp Antetramp 
 Cocummination Cocummination 
 Cartlei Cartlei 
 Oxber Oxber 
 Guet Guet 
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 Ips Ips 
 Gol Gol 
 Woh Woh 
 Pohs Pohs 
 Souuric Souuric 
 Icylettrice Icylettrice 
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Appendix D: Pilot Study Directions 
In this study, we are examining students' perceptions of what the cultural stereotype are for a 
number of different social groups. Therefore, we will show you pictures of people who belong to 
three different racial/ethnic groups and we would like you to list whatever characteristics, traits, 
behaviors, etc. that come to your mind that you think would reflect the cultural stereotype of the 
pictured social group. Keep in mind, we are not interested in your own personal beliefs, 
rather we are interested in your perception of the cultural stereotype of each group. For 
each of the depicted groups, please list four or five thoughts about the cultural stereotype for that 
group. Also, keep in mind that all of your responses are completely anonymous, strictly 
confidential, and do not reflect your personal views. So, please feel free to write anything that 
comes to mind. 
 
 
